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Abstract. We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public monopoly 
allocate water of differing qualities to households and farmers. Most of our results are in line 
with the theoretical predictions. Overexploitation of the resources is observed independently of 
the market structure. Stock depletion for the public monopoly is the fastest, followed by the 
private duopoly and private monopoly. On the positive aspects of centralized public 
management, we find that the average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is 
substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Countries all over the world are increasingly aware that efficiency in water allocation is 
very important. The growing demand
1
 on water resources and the broadly debated 
climate change are among the main reasons why water management is becoming an 
important issue. For example, The Economist drew attention towards the impending 
water crisis in China.
2
 Some of the main problems in China have been due to bad 
management, pollution and pricing of water below cost. Thus, it is now well accepted 
by policy makers that allocating water within the existing allocation mechanisms is 
often inefficient. The need for market-based mechanisms in water management has been 
gaining acceptance in various forums.
3
 In its 1993 policy paper (Water Resources 
Management), the World Bank states that the deterioration and scarcity of fresh water in 
recent times is due to the “…failure to properly consider the economic value of water. 
Given that water is given little or no economic value it is misallocated and misused”. 
However, the extraction process is not the only concern of the authorities involved. In 
recent years, an increasing number of city councils around the world use recycled water 
for drinking
4
, mixing streams that feed into reservoirs
5
 or injecting recycled water into 
ground aquifers. In Australia, with its scarce water resources, water recycling is now set 
to play a much greater part in the water management cycle.
6
 Thus, the quality resulting 
from the mixture of different types of water under different institutional settings is an 
important issue which has received scant attention so far. 
In this paper we build a theoretical model and study experimentally how market 
structure affects the management of two different water resources
7
. We experimentally 
study how different market structures such as a private monopoly, a duopoly and public 
utility may affect water resource extraction and stock management. Furthermore, we 
assume that quality is endogenously determined from the mixture of different types of 
                                                 
1
Recent estimates put the world water market at $300-$325 billion (see Water Pumps, 2008).   
2
See alsoYang et al. 2003. 
3
 Increasingly, cities (countries) are choosing the management and distribution of water resources through 
market mechanisms. Some recent examples include Aman (Jordan), Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) and Lezíria 
del Tajo (Portugal) (http://www.fcc.es/fcc/corp/esp/sdp_n_ddln_332.htm and 
http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/empresas/FCC/gana/macrocontrato/gestion/agua/Portugal/cdscdi/2006
0131cdscdiemp_10/Tes/ ).  
4
 Orange County (U.S.) and Queensland (Australia) are recycling waste water. 
5
 In Virginia (U.S.) recycled water is added to a stream feeding the Occoquan reservoir. 
6
The Australian Academy of Science, http://www.science.org.au/nova/095/095key.htm. 
7
We abstract from the common pool resource problem which has been dealt with in other papers like 
Walker et al. 1990, Walker and Gardner 1992, Gardner et al. 1997 and Mason and Philips 1997. 
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water. Market clears following a complex process based on block rate pricing and a 
smart mechanism, related to the one used in Murphy et al. 2000, enabling us to abstract 
from demand-side behaviour.  
Increasingly, experimental methods are being applied to study alternative 
auctions, rules and market structures in a controlled environment at a reduced cost. 
Laboratory experiments are useful in providing valuable insights that can reduce the 
uncertainty associated with the implementation of new institutions (see Plott 1987). The 
usefulness of applying the experimental methodology lies in the fact that the laboratory 
can be a useful test bed to undertake a direct test of an existing market mechanism 
(Murphy et al. 2000, 2009 and Garrido 2007) or study some proposed new systems. To 
quote Smith 1976 (pp. 274-275), “Laboratory experience suggests that all of the 
characteristics of ‘real world’ behavior that we consider to be of primitive importance 
[...] arise naturally, indeed inevitably, in experimental settings. Furthermore, the process 
of experimental design forces one to articulate rules and procedures, the collection of 
which forms an institution, organization, or ‘body of law’ with striking ‘real world’ 
parallels” (cf. Shubik 1974). The strength of laboratory experiments lies in the fact that 
institutional rules and incentives are clearly defined. The fact that laboratory 
experiments are regularly used in the design of auction mechanisms for a broad 
spectrum of markets lends support to this argument. In that sense, the use of abstract 
and controlled settings serves similar objectives as does the use of subject pools 
recruited among university students. Both strategies help the experimenter study the 
interaction between market institutions and human nature in isolation from other 
confounding factors. 
Murphy et al. 2000, Garrido 2007 and Murphy et al. 2009 are good examples of 
the use of experimental methodology in studying questions arising out of specific 
problems associated with water allocation. Murphy et al. 2000 argue that making 
substantial institutional changes in water systems is cumbersome due to the cost of 
implementing a system and its irreversibility. They use a ‘smart’8 market to study water 
allocation problems in California. Their experiments show that efficiency increases 
when monopoly control over conveyance is replaced with co-tenancy. Garrido 2007, 
meanwhile, tests some of the measures adopted under the 1999 water reforms in Spain. 
Under this reform, junior right holders are not allowed to purchase water from senior 
                                                 
8
 In a ‘smart’ market the central program applies optimization algorithms to the submitted bid-offer 
messages to determine the prices and allocations that maximize the gains from exchange. 
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users. Further, the law did not explicitly define water rights over unused water that 
carries over to the next season. His results show that defining water rights over saved 
units across periods increases the average stock levels of reservoirs, and reduces market 
price instability. Senior users are better off if they are allowed to trade their water rights 
and providing inter-temporal rights to users over unused water results in higher 
reservoir levels. Garrido 2007 shows that the changes in the water law resulted in 
effects that were opposite to those desired by the policy makers. Meanwhile, Murphy et 
al. 2009 test three different water market institutions
9
 incorporating instream flow 
values into the allocation mechanism through active participation of an environmental 
trader. They find that direct environmental participation in the market can achieve 
efficient and stable outcomes. 
In our analysis, market structure is relevant since, although water is generally 
managed by state owned public utilities that are involved in the extraction and 
management of water resources, other management regimes are also possible. The three 
market structures studied here are chosen to reflect the public management status quo 
and two alternative scenarios of privatization, a monopoly and a duopoly one. Rather 
than restricting our analysis to extraction issues, we analyze water quality as the result 
of mixing water from two different water resources.
10
 Given that potable water should 
satisfy some minimum standards, we introduce a costly purification process which is 
automatically activated to keep water quality up to the required minimum.
11
 
In our theoretical framework, extraction efficiency is achieved as long as stocks 
are kept as high and, thus, extraction costs as low as possible. In fact, sufficiently caring 
for future extraction efficiency will force a decision maker to maintain maximal stocks.  
However, towards the final periods of a finite horizon problem, a social planner 
managing a public utility will prefer to intensify extraction beyond this level. This is 
because the vanishing benefits of future extraction efficiency are offset by the present 
benefits from supplying more water to the users. On the contrary, a private monopolist 
will keep stocks at maximal level, although this will be achieved at the cost of lower 
                                                 
9
 The three different property right regimes are: (1) Minimum instream flow constraints without active 
participation of instream flow interests; (2) No instream flow rights, but instream flow demands can be 
met by subsidizing downstream consumption; and (3) Private property rights to instream flow. 
10
 Quality concerns arise when mixing water. For example, residents of the city of Toowoomba in South-
East Queensland rejected a scheme to recycle sewage to top up drinking supplies.  
11
 Though generally irrigation water is not purified, there could be situations where this is the case (as 
suggested by a reviewer, farm water could have a threshold too). In order to simplify the analysis, we do 
not enter into this issue in this paper, assuming that water quality cannot fall below acceptable levels for 
irrigation. 
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output sold to the users. Thus, compared to steady state social welfare maximization, 
inefficiencies may arise either due to an inefficient extraction path or due to the exercise 
of monopoly power. Also, given that the social planner’s payoffs depend also on 
consumer satisfaction from quality, a public utility should supply the highest water 
qualities. Our experimental results largely confirm the predicted ranking of stocks, 
quantities and quality-to-price ratios under public and private management of the 
resources, placing a private duopolistic structure between these two extremes. 
Nevertheless, inefficiently intense extraction appears to be a common and persistent 
error in the three structures leading to systematic deviation from the predicted paths  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we explain the theoretical model. 
In Section 3 we describe the experimental design. Section 4 discusses the experimental 
results. Section 5 concludes. The mathematical details of the model and the instructions 
for experimental subjects are included in the Appendix. 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
There are two renewable stocks SH (high quality stock) and SL (low quality stock) from 
which water may be extracted. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the recharge to 
the respective basin is deterministic and constant and is given by 𝑎𝐻 = 𝑎𝐿. Further, once 
the maximum storable stock, max
HS = 
max
LS , is reached, extra water inflow is lost at no 
private or social cost or benefit. The return flow of consumed water is assumed to be 
negligible. Thus, changes in stocks are exclusively due to extraction and recharge. 
Extraction costs are supposed to be twice differentiable functions of quantity and stock 
size. First derivatives are assumed to be, respectively, positive and negative, whereas 
second derivatives are positive. 
Water resources differ in qualities. Quality of water in an aquifer may be lower 
due to marine intrusion, or due to infiltration of fertilizer from agriculture. Let the 
qualities be denoted respectively by QH and QL, where QH>QL>0. The two qualities are 
assumed to be constant over time. However, any intermediate quality may be supplied 
to the consumers as a result of mixing water from the two sources. Note that strategic 
quality choice is usually studied in the context of two stage product differentiation 
models, many of which belong to a strand initiated by Mussa and Rosen 1978.
12
 In these 
                                                 
12
 For a recent contribution and review of this literature, see García-Gallego and Georgantzís 2009. 
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models, product quality is strategically chosen taking into account the competition-
reducing effect of product differentiation.
13
 Thus, quality choice determines the 
fierceness of price competition. In our paper, the causality is reversed. Final product 
quality is the result rather than the cause of price setting behaviour.  
Mixing quantities KH and KL of the two qualities results in water whose quality is 
given by the weighted average: 
 
LH
LLHH
LHLHM
KK
QKQK
QQKKQ


),,,(    (1) 
 
Resource flow between the sources and the consumers is coordinated by a pair 
of knots that centralize the mixing process at the consumer’s location. Figure 1 helps us 
visualize the structure of the pipeline network considered.  
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Figure 1. The pipeline network. 
 
 
Suppose that the behaviour of the consumers can be aggregated under one of two 
types: i) households (h), and ii) farmers (f). Consumers differ in their respective 
preferences regarding the quality of water. Both types prefer a higher quality, and 
quantity of the water to a lower one. Households consume water whose quality weakly 
                                                 
13
 This is also the theme of an alternative approach by Sucked and Sutton 1982. 
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exceeds a minimum standard. If mixed quality does not satisfy this condition, it will be 
subject to purification. Formally, the quality of potable water should weakly exceed a 
constant minimum quality standard Qmin where QH>Qmin>QL. Mixed water of quality QM 
may, or may not, satisfy the minimum quality standard. This depends on the quantities 
and qualities mixed.  
Quality may be improved at a cost. This cost is an increasing function of the 
difference between the quality before and after purification. Moreover, a given 
improvement Q of a lower quality is less costly than the same improvement performed 
on a higher quality. Let the initial quality subject to purification be Q0. The purification 
cost, denoted by CQ(K, Q, Q0), for a certain water quality Q0 and quantity K=KH+KL 
requiring a quality improvement Q, is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:  
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The specific formulation adopted here is provided in Appendix A. The 
purification procedure is assumed to be costly enough such that it is not profitable to 
improve quality above the minimum standard. Hence, the quality consumed by 
households is the maximum between the minimum potable quality, and the mixed 
quality without purification. Thus, Q0=QM  and the optimal quality improvement is:  





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M
MM
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QQifQQ
Q
min
minmin
0
 
 
Further, assume that the utility functions for the two consumer types are, 
respectively, Uh=Uh(Kh,QMh) and Uf=Uf(Kf,QMf) (where Kh=KHh+KLh and Kf=KHf+KLf). 
The specification used here is twice differentiable in both quality and quantity and is 
provided in Appendix A. Farmers’ utility is increasing in both arguments. While 
depending on the purification cost function, the utility function of households might be 
increasing in the quantity of low quality only up to a certain limit
14
. From twice 
differentiability of the utility functions it follows that the sum of the functions is twice 
differentiable too. Our assumptions concerning consumer utility are qualitatively similar 
to those in Gjerstad et al. 2000, on multiple commodities that are interdependent in 
consumption.  
                                                 
14
In fact, it will be increasing if mixed quality weakly exceeds the minimum quality standard. 
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Following a standard formulation of similar groundwater extraction problems, a 
lower stock implies higher extraction costs. We define ),( iii KSC  as the extraction costs 
of 
iK units from a given stock level iS , for i = H, L. Thus, each period’s unit extraction 
cost and past levels of extraction are positively correlated. Furthermore, we assume that 
the extraction of the first five units from a stock at full capacity is costless. We will call 
stock levels between 16 and 20 units the efficient extraction stock levels or simply 
costless extraction stock levels. The specific correspondence between stock levels and 
extraction costs used here is provided in the table of extraction costs in Appendix B. 
The indirect social welfare function V(KH,KL), which maximizes instantaneous 
consumer surplus for a given quantity of water, can be obtained as a solution to the 
following problem: 
LfHf
LfLHfH
Mf
LhHh
LhLHhH
Mh
LfLhL
HfHhH
LHMfLfHfFLHMhLhHhh
KKKK
LH
KK
KQKQ
Qiv
KK
KQKQ
Qiii
KKKii
KKKi
ts
KKQKKUKKQKKUKKV
LhLfHfHh









)(
)(
)(
)(
..
),;,,(),;,,(max),(
,,,
           
(3) 
For a given extraction policy by the managers of the resources, the allocation of 
different water qualities to the two types of consumers and the subsequent total 
consumption of each water type, is delegated to a “smart” downstream agent, acting 
according to the objective and restrictions of (3). This allows us to focus on the 
behavioural aspects of the supply side. 
In the steady state, inequalities HH aK   and LL aK   must hold in order to 
guarantee the inter-temporal feasibility of the solution. Extraction patterns not satisfying 
these restrictions, lead to a gradual exhaustion of the resources. In fact, the equality 
corresponds to what we call the hydrological equilibrium of the system. In this 
equilibrium, the quantities consumed in each period are equal to the time-unit recharge 
of each resource. However, we will see that this hydrological equilibrium is not 
necessarily satisfied by all the theoretical benchmarks considered. This is the case for 
our private profit seeking monopoly benchmark, in which the firm finds it profitable to 
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sell less than the maximum feasible quantity, yielding under-extraction of the resource. 
On the other extreme, a finite-horizon social planner will tend to extract more than that 
implied by this benchmark towards the end of its extraction period because the concern 
of future extraction efficiency vanishes, while surplus maximization persists.  
In order to address social optimality, we consider the benchmark case of a social 
planner, discounting future total wealth by  maximizing the present value of social 
welfare over an infinite horizon, as indicated by: 
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Without loss of generality, suppose that initially the resource stocks are in the 
natural hydrological equilibrium being equal to the upper bound of the storage capacity. 
The steady state conditions can be formulated as follows: 
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These conditions simultaneously determine the steady-state standing-stocks of 
SH and SL. They state that, in the long run, the marginal social utility, which embodies 
the respective resource price in the economy, should equal the social costs of extraction 
represented on the right hand side. In each condition, the first term reflects the marginal 
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social utility, whereas the other two terms correspond to the marginal cost that results 
from extracting a quantity KH (KL) from the water stock SH (SL).  
Given that our objective is to test the model in the laboratory and in order to 
minimize the role of subjects’ uncontrolled time preferences, we induce zero 
discounting by making a subject’s earnings depend equally on all periods of a session. 
Thus, we focus here on a benevolent, infinitely living planner who cares equally for the 
welfare of both present and future generations. The planner will maximize efficiency in 
each period and will not sacrifice future efficiency in favour of higher present extraction 
as implied by (5). Thus, formally, in the special case of the conditions above 
become:  
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Given our formulation, the conditions in (6) imply that an infinitely living social 
planner should never let the stock levels fall to the point where extraction costs become 
positive, in order to implement the first-best solution. On the contrary, in a finite 
horizon context, the social planner would apply this rule only for an initial number of 
periods and would extract more than implied by this rule towards the last periods, 
because the increase in future extraction costs is bound and thus can be offset by the 
benefits of supplying more water to the users.   
We set 
Ha = ,3La ,20
maxmax  HH SS  QL=1, QH=5 and Qmin=3. Two features, 
which are rather specific to the dynamics of water stocks, are added to the structure: 
First, buyers are restricted to purchase up to 5 units of each type of water, given that 
their purchases in each period are used to serve their current needs. Second, given the 
constant inflow (recharge) in each period, the stock of water in the basins of each 
resource may increase, decrease or remain invariant depending on whether consumption 
is lower, higher or equal to the recharge rate. In all the scenarios considered below 
regarding the management of the resources, we assume that suppliers post a price 
schedule for the first five units of the water type they manage. Let ),...,( 51 iii ppp 
),( LHi be the price schedule submitted for water type i, where pi is a vector of the 
five minimum prices at which the decision maker is willing to sell each one of the five 
units he may sell to the market. We restrict each unit’s price bid to weakly exceed the 
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corresponding extraction cost and, given that extraction costs weakly increase as the 
stock decreases, we also impose that the price bid of the nth unit weakly exceeds the bid 
of the (n-1)th one. 
Given that prices are simply internal transfers from consumers to producers, 
there are various price pairs at which market clearing occurs at the socially optimal 
quantities and stocks. To understand this, we have to consider the price mechanism 
described above. The social planner has to set prices for each one of the five units that 
can be possibly sold into the market from each water quality. This type of pricing, also 
known as block pricing, is similar to simultaneous price/quantity-setting, because the 
decision-maker may set reasonable prices for, say, the first three units of each resource 
and then set prohibitively high price bids for the 4
th
 and 5
th
 unit, restricting consumption 
to three units, although such consumption may also occur for many different price 
schedules. Thus, the social planner can implement the hydrological equilibrium by any 
price vector yielding consumption of 3 units per resource, whereas prices for the 4
th
 and 
5
th
 unit of each resource should be high enough to yield zero consumption beyond the 
third unit. As said above, in the steady state, stocks should be kept sufficiently high so 
that only costless extraction takes place. In other words, this implies that no unit should 
be extracted from stock levels below 15 units. In fact, given the discreteness of our 
design, there is an extraction path whose time average consumption achieves the 
hydrological equilibrium by alternating supplies of (KH, KL)=(4, 2) in one period and 
(KH, KL)=(2, 4) in the other, or vice-versa, that will yield higher payoffs than supplying 
the steady state hydrological equilibrium (KH, KL)=(3, 3). Furthermore, the public utility 
would also prefer to sell one unit more of any of the two products, at any period, 
without incurring higher extraction costs, as long as the stock before extraction is 20 or 
19, so that extracting 4 units does not cause stocks to fall below the efficient extraction 
levels. 
We are also interested in the solutions resulting from a centralized profit 
maximizing management of the two resources as well as a decentralized, non 
cooperative management by two competing profit-maximizing entities. First of all, 
observe that the cost-specific parts of the expressions in (5) are also valid in the private 
monopoly case, because the two types of water are extracted from separate basins, 
resulting in a separable cost function. Intuitively, this is a natural consequence of the 
fact that the stock level of one resource does not affect extraction costs specific to the 
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other resource. Specifically, equilibrium for the private monopoly case is characterized 
by the condition:  
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Where R denotes the total revenue obtained from selling both types of water to 
the two types of consumers. As in the textbook case, the profit-maximizing monopolist 
accounts for the reduction in marginal revenue caused by an extra unit sold in the 
market. Thus,
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 for all positive output levels KH, KL.  
For the conditions in (7) become:  
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Given the parameters of our experiment, private monopoly profits are 
maximized for a supply of (KH=1, KL=2), which occurs at prices (pH=392, pL=167). 
Thus, the private monopolist is interested in restricting output and not letting the stocks 
fall below their maximum level. This implies that the private monopolist sells lower 
output and an even lower quality (due to a smaller participation of high quality water in 
the final mix) at prices that are higher than any of the price pairs implemented by the 
public utility. Furthermore, given that HH aK 1  and, LL aK  2 , there is an excess 
of inflow which is systematically lost from the system, so aquifers are always at full 
capacity. 
In the non-cooperative duopolistic management structure, equilibrium conditions 
become: 
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𝜕𝑝𝐿
− [
𝜕𝐶𝐿(𝑆𝐿, 𝐾𝐿)
𝜕𝐾𝐿
−
1
𝛿
𝜕𝐶𝐿(𝑆𝐿, 𝐾𝐿)
𝜕𝑆𝐿
]
𝜕𝐾𝐿(𝑝𝐻 , 𝑝𝐿)
𝜕𝑝𝐿
= 0 
           (9) 
Where, RH and RL denote the two competing entities’ revenues, respectively. This 
resembles the standard duopoly case. The left hand side in (9) fails to account for the 
  13  
pecuniary negative externality of each type of water on the profitability of the other. 
That is, while the private monopolist accounts for the effect of selling an extra unit of 
high quality water on the market price of low quality (and vice-versa), duopolists do not 
internalize the horizontal pecuniary externality. For the conditions in (9) become:  
   
0
),(
0
),(
),(),(
),(),(








B
L
B
HLH
B
L
B
HLH
ppppL
LLL
ppppH
HHH
S
KSC
S
KSC
    (10) 
However, the duopoly equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist due to the 
discreteness of our setup and the possibility of simultaneously setting price and 
quantity. Nevertheless, intuitively, duopolistic prices and quantities will range between 
the corresponding magnitudes under private monopoly and the social planner’s solution. 
To show this, we consider a unilateral deviation by the low-quality duopolist from the 
monopolistic equilibrium reported above. By decreasing the price-bid from 167 to 160 
for the first 3 units, and then setting a prohibitively high price of, say, 1000 monetary 
units for the 4
th
 and 5
th 
unit of water, the duopolist increases its profits from 334 to 480. 
The high quality duopolist also increases its profits from 392 to 400, by reducing the 
price from 392 to 200, thus increasing its output from one to two units.  
These deviations are not unique or optimal in any way, but they show that mixed 
price strategies will be below private monopoly prices and quantities will be above the 
private monopoly ones. In terms of stocks, given that these deviations yield 
consumption of less than 3 units for at least the low quality water, we cannot exclude 
the possibility that stocks in duopoly may be maximal and, thus, non distinguishable 
from stocks under private monopoly. We now consider duopolists’ deviations from 
price/quantity schedules which implement the social first best. For example, prices of 50 
for high and 30 for low quality water and limiting consumption to three units by 
prohibitively high prices for the 4
th
 and 5
th
 units of each resource, is one among many 
schemes implementing the first best solution. The high quality duopolist can raise its 
profit from 150 to 200 by unilaterally deviating from this scheme, if it restricts output to 
1 unit and raises the price to 200. Similarly, the low quality duopolist will increase its 
profit from 90 to 100 units by raising its price from 30 to 50 and decreasing output from 
3 to 2 units. 
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 We summarize our benchmark predictions for the parameters used in the 
experiment reported below: 
 A public utility will set any price pair among many which implement the 
time-average quantities dictated by the hydrological equilibrium of 3 units 
from each resource, although this would be optimally achieved by alternating 
combinations (4, 2) and (2, 4) in subsequent periods. In a finite horizon 
context, reduction of stocks below the zero extraction cost level will take 
place towards the last periods.  
 A private monopoly will keep stocks at maximum level and will sell 1 unit of 
the high quality and 2 units of the low quality water at prices 392 and 167, 
respectively. Due to this mix, quality will be lower than in the first best 
solution implemented by the public utility, and some resource will be lost due 
to under-extraction with respect to the hydrological equilibrium.  
 Duopolists will set prices (sell outputs) below (above) private monopoly ones, 
while stocks will be (weakly) lower than maximum and higher than those 
under a public utility. Quality will also be lower than in the case of a public 
utility and weakly higher than under a private monopoly. 
 
In terms of the observable magnitudes, the aforementioned predictions can be used to 
formulate the following testable hypotheses: 
 
H1: Stocks will be maximal under a private monopoly and minimal towards 
the final periods under a public utility with a finite horizon, while duopoly stocks will 
range between these two extremes.  
 
 Apart from the predictions regarding the steady state stocks, we have a clear cut 
prediction regarding the outputs of the two types of water. The prediction stems from 
the fact that the hydrological equilibrium of the system implemented by the public 
utility requires that per period extraction levels must equal the rate of recharge of each 
resource. This is stated in the following testable hypothesis:  
 
H2: Compared to the public utility, a private monopoly will significantly 
restrict output limiting the proportion of the high quality water in the mix consumed. 
Duopoly output ranges between these two extremes. 
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Following these two predictions, quality-to-price ratios are expected to exhibit 
the following pattern:   
 
H3: Quality-to-price ratios (prices) will be lower (higher) as we move from 
public management to duopoly and from duopoly to private monopoly. 
 
Generally speaking, overconsumption of water is a rather extended problem in 
modern societies and it should be interesting to know whether, beyond natural scarcity, 
there are behavioural and institutional factors for the phenomenon to emerge even in 
abstract, initially non-scarcity involving situations like the ones implemented here.       
 
 
3. Experimental Design 
We experimentally tested the aforementioned hypotheses. All sessions were run in the 
Laboratori d’Economia Experimental at the Universitat Jaume I (Castellón, Spain) with 
undergraduate students in their final year of the BA in Business Administration. They 
knew the type of water resource they were managing, labelled as “low” or “high quality 
water”. Subjects were told about the generic preference by consumers for high quality 
water over the low quality one. They also knew that the products were demand 
substitutes (though not perfect) and that the extraction costs were identical as specified 
in the written instructions provided to them (see Appendix B). The software designed 
specifically in our lab for the purpose of this experiment
15
 offered a simulator which 
calculated each unit’s hypothetical costs and gains, in case the unit were actually 
consumed after markets cleared.
16
 They were also informed that the automated demand 
was programmed to react to price bids as a “smart” representative agent consuming and 
allocating quantities across consumer types in a way that maximizes total surplus. Thus, 
given each bidding schedule, consumer surplus maximization determined the quantity 
consumed for each quality. A history window displayed all past outcomes regarding 
own decisions, i.e. quantities, payoffs and market clearing prices. 
                                                 
15
Distributed for research and training uses only, under the name “Hydromanagement”, as freeware upon 
request from the authors. 
16
 It is standard practice in experiments to give subjects a calculator that allows them to calculate their 
profits, given what others produce. The use of such a simulator provides them with a hypothetical 
exercise that forces them to think on the consequences of their actions as a response to others’ strategies. 
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Experimental markets lasted for 50 periods. In each period, subjects submitted 
five offer bids (minimum selling price) for each one of the first five units in their stocks 
for each one of the products they managed. All units of the same product were sold at 
the same market clearing price. All subjects were informed about how the market 
clearing price was determined. 
Three different treatments were run. Table 1 below includes the details of the 
treatments. A number of learning rounds (not presented in the results) were run at the 
beginning of each session to familiarize the subjects with market conditions. Each 
session lasted on average 80 minutes. In all treatments, subjects were paid the sum of 
their profits in 15 randomly selected periods. Average earnings per subject were slightly 
below 25€. Duopoly sessions were more expensive as a higher exchange rate was used 
(see instructions in Appendix B) to avoid significant differences in individual subject 
rewards. Even though actual earnings depended on subject choices, this was done to 
avoid any extreme variations of expected per capita earnings across treatments.
17
 
 
Table 1: Experimental design 
Treatment Decision makers 
Sessions 
(Periods) 
Subjects / 
session 
Learning 
rounds 
Private 
Monopoly (T1) 
A single profit maximizing 
monopolist. 
3 (50) 20 Yes 
Duopoly (T2) 
Two independent profit 
maximizing firms. 
4 (50) 20 Yes 
Public 
Utility (T3) 
Social welfare maximizing 
public monopoly. 
3 (50) 20 Yes 
 
 
Apart from the standard feedback received after each period in the monopoly 
treatments, in duopoly markets each subject observed also the clearing price at which 
the rival water quality was sold.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Note that it is standard practice in experiments to avoid extreme earning inequalities across treatments. 
This is done to maintain incentives. This, however, does not affect results as exchange rates are the same 
within a treatment. See, for example, Rassenti et al. 2000 (p. 123). 
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4. Results 
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics for the two stocks, market clearing prices, 
quantities consumed and quality to price ratio. Statistics are provided for the whole 
experiment and the last 30 periods of it, in order to trace possible learning effects. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for stocks, prices and quantities (by treatment) 
Variable Firm Treatment Average Std. Deviation 
Average 
(periods 20-50) 
Std. Deviation 
(periods 20-50) 
Quantity 
Low Quality 
T1 3.0 0.3 2.9 0.1 
T2 3.0 0.2 2.9 0.2 
T3 3.1 0.3 3.0 0.1 
High Quality 
T1 2.9 0.2 2.8 0.2 
T2 3.0 0.3 2.9 0.1 
T3 3.1 0.3 3.0 0.1 
Price 
Low Quality 
T1 101.9 11.9 108.4 6.5 
T2 69.8 5.2 72.2 3.6 
T3 51.1 9.1 52.0 8.7 
High Quality 
T1 108.8 12.0 113.6 9.5 
T2 75.7 8.1 80.0 5.3 
T3 67.1 12.3 69.8 12.7 
Stock 
Low Quality 
T1 11.4 1.2 10.9 0.3 
T2 12.4 1.2 11.7 0.4 
T3 9.5 1.7 8.7 0.5 
High Quality 
T1 12.7 1.1 12.2 0.4 
T2 11.1 1.2 10.5 0.3 
T3 9.3 1.9 8.3 0.7 
Average Quality/Price 
T1 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 
T2 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00 
T3 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.03 
 
 
The average quantity sold under a social planner (T3) is approximately equal to 
3 units, which is compatible with the prediction in H2 concerning the hydrological 
equilibrium of the system, according to which the time average of consumption equals 
the rate of recharge. Furthermore, as predicted in H2, output under a private monopoly 
(T1) will be lower than this, while less high quality than low quality water will be sold 
in this structure. Finally, in duopoly (T2), output weakly lies between these two 
extremes, although the significance of these differences will be tested below using non 
parametric tests. In the same table we also observe that distinguishing between data 
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from the whole session and data from the late rounds (20 to 50) shows that, probably 
due to learning, quantities sold get closer to the hydrological equilibrium over time. 
Further, the standard deviation in all treatments of quantities for both water qualities 
falls from between 0.20 and 0.30 to between 0.20 and 0.10. 
Within each treatment, average prices reflect qualities following the pattern of a 
higher price for a higher water quality. This resembles the usual result from vertical 
differentiation models in which equilibrium prices are ranked in the same way as 
product qualities. Furthermore, prices across treatments offer full support to the 
corresponding prediction in H3. That is, private monopoly prices are higher than 
duopoly ones, which, in their turn, are higher than prices under a social planner. 
 
4.1. Stock Levels 
Before proceeding with detailed analysis and hypothesis testing, we first plot (Figure 2) 
average stocks from all sessions of the Public Utility treatment. That is, we plot first 
aggregate data from sessions in which subjects were acting in the absence of strategic 
interaction and were rewarded according to overall levels of social welfare. We also plot 
the socially optimal path for the 50-period horizon of the experimental sessions. The 
figure also shows the observed and optimal paths for costs and social benefits, for the 
specific parameters implemented in the experiment. It can be seen that until period 31, 
the social planner should keep stocks as close to maximal levels as possible, selling, 
first, 4 and 3 units of high and low quality water, respectively, and then alternating 
between outputs (4, 2) and (2, 4). From period 31 to 49, the planner should follow a 
decreasing stock path, alternating between (4, 3) and (3, 4). Finally in the last period, (4, 
4) are the socially optimal outputs, because (5, 5) is not an economically feasible 
combination due to the high extraction cost (50) from a stock level of 10.  
Apparently, our subjects fail to realize the importance of keeping extraction 
costs at minimum levels by maintaining stock levels close to the maximum of 20 units 
throughout the first half of the session. Instead, they overexploited the resource starting 
from the early periods of the session, gaining an initial (periods 1-6 only) advantage 
over the theoretical path in terms of social benefits. However, as can be seen from 
comparison of the areas in which actual and optimal benefits have exceeded each other, 
overall observed profits have been significantly lower and costs higher than the 
optimum throughout the session. In fact, the initial periods in which more intense 
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extraction yields higher profits than the optimal path, may be partly responsible for 
subjects’ commitment to this erroneous pattern of behaviour. 
 From this first look at the stock dynamics observed in the case of the public 
utility, we can conjecture that, due to possible learning errors, decisions by human 
subjects in such a complex setting can generate suboptimal extraction patterns, even in 
the presence of the right incentives for a socially optimal management of the resources. 
Although hypothesis H1 is compatible with a decreasing trend of stocks after period 31, 
the waste of the resource throughout the session is such that subjects would have been 
better off if they had raised stocks. It can be shown that a subject whose early errors 
lead stocks to an inefficiently low stock of, say, 7 units, would still find it profitable to 
restrict output and rise stocks even if the error is detected towards the 30
th
 or 40
th
 period. 
That is, the overall tendency to extract beyond the efficient levels cannot be explained 
as the result of early errors which become too costly to correct after a given number of 
periods, locking subjects into suboptimal paths. 
What remains to be seen is whether the alternative market structures studied here 
can improve the situation through (i) a private, profit-oriented incentive mechanism, or 
(ii) a decentralized competitive market. It should be noted, that in the case of the private 
firm, the corresponding theoretical prediction foresees a deviation from the social 
optimum, as the private monopoly never finds it profitable to sell more than 1 unit of 
high and 2 units of low quality water, keeping stocks at maximal levels throughout the 
session and quality below that of the public utility. Thus, the loss of efficiency predicted 
is due to the exercise of market power leading to output restrictions and suboptimal 
output mix.  
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Figure 2. Optimal and observed stocks, profits and extraction costs for the public utility (T3) 
 
The most interesting of our results regard hypothesis H1 on the management of 
stock levels. Table 2 shows differences in stock averages across treatments. In Table 3 
we report results from non-parametrically testing the significance of these differences. It 
can be observed that all treatment differences in stocks are statistically significant at 
least at 5%.  In fact, all comparisons confirm H1, except for the difference in the low 
quality stocks across T1 and T2. Therefore, the prediction of higher stocks as we move 
from the public utility to duopoly and private monopoly is mostly supported.  
Figures 3 and 4 compare water stock management across the three market 
structures. In each graph, the grey area corresponds to stock levels from which 
extraction would occur at no cost. As we have mentioned, stocks should remain within 
this area at least until period 31 for the public utility and throughout the session for the 
private monopolist. Contrary to this prediction, all treatments have led decision makers 
to extract from inefficiently low stocks. In fact, both stocks have been below the 
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minimum efficient level in all treatments from very early periods (5
th
 period, the latest) 
of the experiment. This implies that due to purely behavioural reasons scarcity may 
occur even in the absence of exogenous restrictions in the availability of the resource.  
 
Table 3: Stocks across treatments: Wilcoxon test statistic 
 Low Quality Stock High Quality Stock 
 z p>|z| z p>|z| 
T1 = T2 -6.393 0.000 6.384 0.000 
T1 = T3 6.342 0.000 6.359 0.000 
T3 = T2 -6.384 0.000 -6.307 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of experimental stocks (averages) of low quality water. 
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Figure 4. Evolution of experimental stocks (averages) of high quality water.  
 
 
 
4.2. Quantities sold 
Note that the prediction from H2 is that the quantities sold should be lower in the 
private than in the public utility case and that the latter should, on average, achieve and 
maintain the natural hydrological equilibrium (KH, KL)=(aH, aL)=(3, 3) until period 31. 
Duopoly quantities should lie between these two benchmarks. As was already observed 
from the descriptive statistics on Table 2, Figures 5 and 6 show that the output chosen 
for the two qualities is close to 3 in all treatments, indicating the prevalence of the 
hydrological equilibrium over alternative rules. However, it is interesting to note that 
the output extracted by the public utility consistently lies above the output chosen by the 
private duopoly and private monopoly. Table 4 reports results obtained from a 
Wilcoxon test run to check the significance of these differences, confirming the 
prediction that the social planner will supply more water to the market than the private 
monopolist, while duopoly output will be between these benchmarks, except for the 
case of low quality water, in which output cannot be distinguished from that supplied by 
a private monopoly. 
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Figure 5. Experimental quantities (averages) of low quality water sold.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Experimental quantities (averages) of high quality water sold. 
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Table 4. Wilcoxon test on quantities across treatments 
 Quantity - Low Q Quantity - High Q 
 z p>|z| z p>|z| 
T1 = T2 1.606 0.108 -3.276 0.001 
T1 = T3 -3.798 0.000 -5.640 0.000 
T3 = T2 3.720 0.000 4.619 0.000 
 
 
 
4.3. Average quality to price ratio 
From the ranking of prices on Table 2 and the result on output levels, we expect that H3 
is also confirmed. However, in order to directly test H3, we have to study treatment 
effects on the quality to price ratio.  
 Figure 7 presents the average quality/price ratio, PQ / , where Q is the average 
quality defined in expression (1), and 
LH
LLHH
KK
PKPK
P


 . It is easy to see that the 
public monopoly provides the highest quality to price ratio relative to all other 
treatments. The average quality ratio provided by the duopoly is slightly above the 
private monopoly. A rather striking feature is the volatile pattern of the ratio obtained in 
the public monopoly treatment. This is in sharp contrast with the smooth patterns of the 
other two market structures. This difference can be understood taking into account that 
in this setup, the public monopolist receives more complex feedback that partly, but 
directly, depends on the consumer’s social welfare. Specifically, the consumer’s loss 
associated with the cost of purification, in case the quality falls below the “potable” 
threshold, negatively affects the feedback received by subjects on the success of their 
strategies. Volatility arises due to the continuous effort by subjects (each one 
representing the social planner) to cope with the additional objective of maintaining 
quality above a certain level (in order not to trigger the costly, thus inefficient, 
purification procedure). 
Table 5 below presents the Wilcoxon t-test values for the comparison between 
average quality/price levels across the three market structures. Average quality to price 
is statistically different across all three treatments in the way predicted by H3, according 
to which price to quality ratio increases as we move from private monopoly to duopoly 
and public utility.  
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Figure 7. Evolution of quality-to-price ratio (averages). 
 
 
Table 5. Average Quality/Price ratio: 
Wilcoxon test statistic across treatments 
  
 z p>|z| 
T1 = T2 -6.393 0.000 
T1 = T3 -6.393 0.000 
T3 = T2 6.393 0.000 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we provide the first experimental attempt at studying water management of 
two different water resources endogenously determining the quality of water supplied 
by a public utility, a private monopoly and a duopoly to consumers who differ in their 
preferences on quality. Our structure is inspired by the problem of growing importance 
in many countries regarding the level of disaggregation of decision making and 
management of national, or regional, aquifers. In terms of extraction efficiency, public 
management is both theoretically and empirically shown to be the least successful of the 
0 
.03 
.06 
.09 
.12 
.15 
.18 
.21 
.24 
.27 
.3 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
Time 
Private Mon. Duopoly 
Public Mon. 
Average Quality to Price Ratio 
  26  
structures considered, although it is the most successful one in achieving the highest 
quality to price ratios. 
 Our experiments identify a purely behavioural foundation of resource 
overexploitation. That is, rather than natural scarcity or wrong institutional design, 
water over-exploitation may be due to human decision errors which persist even after a 
large number of periods of learning from past actions and feedback. Unfortunately, 
according to our results, this type of error cannot be avoided by any market institution 
alone, although management by a social planner exacerbates this behavioural bias as 
compared to a private duopoly or monopoly. As said already, this shortcoming of public 
management must be compared with the advantage of a higher water quality supplied to 
the consumers, given that the social planner is more generous with the high quality 
contained in its quality mix. Our experimental results suggest that, rather than the 
degree of centralization of the decision making process, what really matters is the 
market institution providing decision makers with different incentives.  
An interesting implication of our setup is that block rate pricing and the overall 
market clearing mechanism used here are useful in allocating water resources even in 
the case of a public utility. On the contrary, learning from trial and error is not sufficient 
for our subjects to find the optimal extraction path, despite their ability to figure out and 
implement the hydrological equilibrium of the system. In this respect, the difference 
between the public and the private monopoly scenarios is that the former faces a more 
complex problem than the latter does. While the public utility receives feedback on both 
revenues and consumer surplus, the private monopolist receives feedback on own 
profits and is adjusting strategies accordingly. In fact, incentives for the public utility 
are such that subjects post their bids aiming at simultaneously satisfying the condition 
for the hydrological equilibrium of the system and, at the same time, keeping water 
quality high. Whether the complexity of the problem and the resulting feedback induce 
a persistent learning shortcoming or not is not answered by our results so far. Thus, 
useful extensions of the experiments presented here would be to allow for longer 
sessions, more informative feedback and even a smart agent assisting subjects on the 
supply side. Future research should also focus on the effect of increasing the number of 
firms, and introducing competitive extraction from a common pool. 
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6. Appendix 
6.1. Appendix A: Mathematical model 
We provide here the specific mathematical expressions used here to implement the model 
outlined in the main text. The household’s instantaneous utility is given by the following 
function: 
 
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The farmer’s instantaneous utility is given by:  
 )())(3(5.01ln170),,( HfLfHfLfMfMfLfHff KKKKQQKKU   
Resource i’s (i = H, L) extraction costs of 
iK units from a given stock level iS is denoted by
),( iii KSC . For the discrete case implemented here, this information is summarized in the Table 
of extraction costs in Appendix B below. Also, in the discrete version here, household and 
farmer utilities from the consumption of all possible combinations between zero and five units 
are summarized in the following table: 
 
household Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 
High 0 0 174 301 356 378 378 
1 399 492 579 637 679 711 
2 555 624 690 753 797 832 
3 660 717 771 822 869 906 
4 740 789 836 880 920 959 
5 806 849 890 929 965 999 
       
farmer Low 0 1 2 3 4 5 
High  0 0 187 354 471 560 631 
1 274 391 491 572 639 696 
2 422 509 584 647 702 749 
3 525 594 655 707 753 794 
4 604 662 712 757 798 834 
5 668 717 761 801 836 869 
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6.2. Appendix B: Instructions to subjects 
Treatments 1, 2 and 3 
The aim of this experiment is to study how people make their decisions in certain contexts. 
Your decisions, in the scenario explained below in detail, will be directly related to a monetary 
reward you will receive in cash at the end of the experiment. Any doubt you may have will be 
clarified personally (to you) by one of the organizers after you raise your hand. Beyond these 
questions, any other communication is strictly forbidden and is subject to immediate exclusion 
from the experiment.  
You participate in a market that is characterized by the following features: 
 You are the only producer of two commodities: product H and product L. [Treatment 2: 
There are two producers (1 and 2) and two commodities (product H and product L)]. 
[Treatment 3: You represent a social planner who produces two commodities: product H 
and product L.] Specifically, product H is water of High quality, while product L is water 
of Low quality. Products Hand L are substitutes, namely, consumers may, to a certain 
extent, substitute one type of water with the other. 
 Treatment 2: You are one of the two producers in this market. At the beginning of the 
session, the computer will indicate if you are producer 1 or 2. Your competitor will be one 
(always the same) of the subjects in this room, randomly selected by the computer when the 
session starts. 
 There are two types of consumers: households and farmers. Although they have different 
preferences with respect to the two types of water, they all prefer water of high quality 
(product H) to water of low quality (product L). That is, they are willing to pay more for H 
than for L. 
 The market will last for 50 rounds. 
 
Decision Making 
Your only decision as a producer is announcing the minimum price at which you are willing to 
sell each one from a maximum of 5 units you may sell for each product. Such announcements of 
minimum prices are called price bids. In order to make your decisions, you have to take into 
account that: 
1.  The extraction cost per additional unit extracted and by product is included in the “table of 
costs” below. These costs are the same for the two products [Treatment 2: (therefore, costs 
conditions for you and your competitor are identical)], and they are expressed in ExCUs, a 
fictitious Experimental Currency Unit. 
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2. Taking into account the costs of the table, you have to announce five minimum prices at 
which you are willing to sell each unit of the five units of each [Treatment 2: your] product 
you may sell in each product. Therefore, your decision making process consists of fixing 5 
price bids for each [Treatment 2: your] product. 
3. You should have in mind that, in order not to make any losses, price bids cannot be lower 
than the corresponding unit costs included in the table of costs. 
4. Price bids cannot be decreasing. That is, your bid for the 1
st
 unit cannot be higher than your 
bid for the 2
nd
 unit; the bid for the 2
nd
 cannot be higher than the bid for the 3
rd
 unit, and so 
on and so forth. 
5. Observe in the table that the unit costs decrease with the stock size. At the beginning of the 
session, you have an initial stock size of 20 units [Treatments 1 and 3: for each product]. At 
the beginning of each round, you get three more units [Treatments 1 and 3: for each type of 
water]. 
6. Your stock size [Treatments 1 and 3: for each type of water] can never exceed 20 units and, 
therefore, once 20 units are reached, any additional units you may receive are lost.  
 
 
Stock size 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 
Unit cost 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 4 
           
Stock size 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Unit cost 7 11 18 30 50 82 135 223 368 607 
    Table of extraction costs (expressed in ExCUs) 
 
Example 
Suppose that at the end of a round your stock size [Treatments 1 and 3: of one of your products] 
is 9 units. At the beginning of the new round, you get your additional 3 units (so that your stock 
now is 12 units). Observe in the table that, for a stock size of 12 units, the unit cost for the first 
five units extracted is the following: 
 the cost of the 1st unit: 2 ExCUs    
 the cost of the 2nd unit: 4 ExCUs 
 the cost of the 3rd unit: 7 ExCUs 
 the cost of the 4th unit: 11 ExCUs 
 the cost of the 5th unit: 18 ExCUs 
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In order not to make losses, each one of your bids should not be lower than the 
corresponding unit cost. Therefore, in this example, your bid for the 1
st
 unit should not be lower 
than 2 ExCUs (cost of the 1
st
 unit); your bid for the 2
nd
 unit should not be lower than neither 4 
ExCUs (cost of this unit) nor your bid for the 1
st
 unit; your bid for the 3
rd
 unit should not be 
lower than neither 7 ExCUs nor your bid for the 2
nd
 unit, and so on for the rest of the units. 
In case you sell 5 units [Treatments 1 and 3: of this product], the stock size at the beginning 
of next round would be 10 units (7 you kept plus 3 you get in the new round). If, given your 
bids for the five units, your sales are zero, your stock would be 15 units (12 you already had 
plus 3 you get at the beginning of the round). 
 
Decisions  
 You make decisions on the minimum price at which you are willing to sell each unit of 
each one of the two products [Treatment 2: of your product]. You will fill in all the boxes 
that appear at your computer screen with your price bids [Treatments 1 and 3: (5 bids for 
product H and 5 for product L)]. In each box, you will also get information related to the 
corresponding unit cost. The bids you submit have to be integer numbers between zero and 
2000.  
 Although you may propose five different price bids, all units of the same product will be 
sold to consumers at a single price. This price will be your bid for the “last” unit sold of 
each product. The number of units sold each period is calculated by a program that 
simulates the optimal behaviour of consumers. 
 
Example 
In the example above, assume that your bids for [Treatment 2: your product] one of the products 
are: 10 (for the 1
st
 unit), 12 (for the 2
nd
), 14 (for the 3
rd
), 16 (for the 4
th
) and 20 (for the 5
th
). 
Given your bids, the program that simulates the optimal behaviour of consumers, determines 
that 3 units of this product will be sold. The price at which you will sell the three units will be 
your bid for the 3rd unit, that is, 14 ExCUs.  
 
Only Treatments 1 and 2: The profits 
 Your net profit of selling each unit of a product will be the difference between the market 
price at which you sold all units [Treatment 1: of that specific product] (your unit income) 
and the corresponding unit extraction cost. Total profits will be the sum of the unit profits 
for all periods. 
 
Example 
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Taking again the previous example, if, at the beginning of a round, your stock size is 12 units, 
your total profits in that round will be 29 ExCUs, which are decomposed as follows: 
i)  12 ExCUs for the 1st unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 2 ExCUs it 
costs you extracting it). 
ii) 10 ExCUs for the 2
nd
 unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 4 ExCUs it 
costs you extracting it). 
iii) 7 ExCUs for the 3rd unit sold (14 ExCUs you receive for that unit minus 7 ExCUs it 
costs you extracting it).  
 
Only Treatment 3: The aim 
 As a social planner, your aim in each round is to maximize the social benefit per unit sold in 
this market, which is defined as the difference between the utility level generated by each 
unit consumed and the corresponding unit extraction cost.  
 
The information 
 During decision making, the computer will provide you with a table simulating results 
[Treatment 1: (for each product)], conditional to your bid and cost for the corresponding 
unit in five possible scenarios: a) In case you only sell the 1
st
 unit; b) If you just sell the first 
two units; …e) In case you sell 5 units.  
 Only Treatment 3: At the beginning of each round, the computer will provide you with a 
table containing, conditional to the stock size for each type of water and all possible 
combinations of consumption of the two products, the corresponding social benefits 
(measured as the difference between the utility level and corresponding extraction costs) of 
that round. 
 At the end of each round, the computer screen will show you the total profits [Treatment 3: 
social benefits] obtained in that round, including information about unit cost, market price 
and number of units sold of each product, [Treatment 2: as well as your rival’s price]. 
 During the experiment, you will be provided with a screen containing the history of past 
rounds (market price for each product, number of units sold, [Treatments 1 and 3: of each 
product], [Treatments 1 and 2: total revenue and total profits [Treatment 1: per product]], 
[Treatment 3: and social benefit]). 
 
Monetary reward 
 Your monetary reward at the end of the session will be the sum of your profits accumulated 
in 15 rounds (randomly selected by the computer) of the total of 50 rounds, at an 
equivalence rate of 800 ExCUs=1 Euro [Treatment 2: 500 ExCUs=1 Euro]. You will be 
paid in cash at the end of the session. 
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In order to make sure you understood correctly the market described above, we will proceed 
next to run a pilot session of 5 rounds. Please, feel free to make any questions you may have 
during this pilot session. 
 
Thank you for your collaboration. Good luck!  
